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Health reform is once againa front-page story in the
United States. This is hardly a
surprise: since 1970, US health
policy has followed a pre-
dictable (and seemingly unend-
ing) cycle of discovering a crisis
in the health system, identifying
and debating policy solutions,
ultimately doing little or noth-
ing in the way of reform while
extolling the virtues of markets
and state innovation, only to re-
discover later that the system is
still in crisis. Having rejected
the health reforms proposed by
President Bill Clinton in 1993,
which would have created a sys-
tem of universal health insur-
ance through and employer
mandate, and having largely ig-
nored the issue for the ensuing
decade, the US finds itself
(again) with a troubled health
system badly in need of reform.1
In recent years, the number
of Americans without health
insurance has grown substan-
tially while health care spend-
ing has accelerated (see Box 1).
The growth in the uninsured
population is the result of a
significant decline in em-
ployer-sponsored insurance,
the primary source of health
insurance for US workers and
their families. The 2001 reces-
sion and weaker-than-expected
job growth in subsequent years
has led to the erosion of health
insurance coverage, especially
among small businesses.
Another factor driving the
growth in the uninsured popula-
tion is rising health care costs.
The rate of increase for health
premiums “slowed” in 2004 to
11%, and it is a sign of the de-
pressing state of affairs in US
health policy that this was actu-
ally considered good news. Pri-
vate-sector actors in the health
care system are pessimistic
about the ability of managed
care, competition, or any other
market-led strategy to stem this
tide, although there is develop-
ing interest in insurance plans
that require more cost-sharing
from patients, including high
deductibles. (These misnamed
“consumer-driven health care”
plans are the latest magic bullet
in US health policy).6 At the
same time, cash-strapped states
have curtailed efforts at expand-
ing publicly funded insurance
coverage and some have cut en-
rolment and benefits in health
programs for the poor. Mean-
while, premiums for US
Medicare, which provides fed-
eral health insurance to over 41
million elderly and disabled
people, are slated to rise by 17%
next year.
The 2004 US presidential
election, then, is taking place
against the backdrop of a steady
stream of bad news about the
health care system. Yet there is
no consensus over what, if any-
thing, should be done about
these problems. Indeed, presi-
dential candidates George W.
Bush and John Kerry have of-
fered dramatically different pro-
posals for health reform (see
Box 2).
While the political differ-
ences between the 2 candidates
on health policy may be appar-
ent, political calculations also
underlie the Kerry and the Bush
reform plans. The Bush strate-
gists calculate that, with public
attention focused on Iraq and
the war on terror, they do not
need to offer a comprehensive
health reform alternative. They
believe that the Democrats’ ad-
vantage on the issue can be neu-
tralized by criticizing the Kerry
plan as “government-run health
care” and by emphasizing its un-
affordability (in the context of
record federal budget deficits)
and reliance on tax increases.
The Kerry campaign, applying
lessons learned from the Clin-
ton health-reform debacle, is
betting that a plan that does not
alter health insurance arrange-
ments for already insured Amer-
icans or impose any mandates
on employers, and that builds
on familiar public programs as
well as private insurance, can be
sold to the voting public.
Through a reinsurance policy
that would keep the costs of em-
ployer-based plans down by re-
lieving them of  75% of the bur-
den of the most expensive
patients, the Kerry plan is de-
signed, in part, to give insured
voters a stake in health reform
and thereby broaden the con-
stituency for change beyond the
predominantly low-income (and
low-voting) uninsured popula-
tion. The Kerry plan is also
predicated on the belief that
voters will support progressive
financing of health reform, since
the insurance expansion is to be
paid for by rolling back tax cuts
for the wealthiest Americans
(those with annual earnings over
$200 000).
There is one calculation that
both plans apparently share:
cost control is a political non-
starter. Neither candidate
would do anything to control
rising health care spending.
(The Kerry reinsurance pro-
posal could, if it worked, miti-
gate premium increases in pri-
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Box 1: US health care: trends in insurance
and in spending
• Number of Americans without health insurance
in 2003: 45 million (15.6% of population)
• Increase in uninsured population since 2002:
4 million2
• Percentage of population under age 65 with
employer-sponsored insurance in 2001: 67%
• Percentage in 2003: 63%3
• Average yearly growth in health care spending,
per capita, 2001–2003: 9%
• Increase in premiums for employer-sponsored
health plans since 2001: 59%
• Increase in wages in the same period: 12%4,5
• Scheduled increase in premiums for Medicare
recipients in 2005: 17%
vate health insurance, but these
costs would then be shifted to
the federal government.) Kerry
and Bush both favour cost-con-
trol rhetoric that speaks of re-
ducing fraud and abuse, mod-
ernizing the health sector
through information technol-
ogy, and reforming the medical
malpractice system. Yet here
they are tilting at windmills,
since none of these problems is
a primary cause of rising costs,
while the real giants of medical
inflation — the inevitably high
administrative costs of a frag-
mented multipayer system,
high prices and provider in-
comes, and unrestrained diffu-
sion and utilization of expen-
sive medical technologies — go
on undisturbed by this charade.
Single-payer proposals that
would control these cost drivers
with Canadian-style global
budgets occupy at best a mar-
ginal position in the current
US debate. This is a corollary
of the political paradox of
health reform in the US: rising
costs put reform on the agenda,
but the better a plan actually is
at controlling costs, the worse
its political viability, conse-
quently generating reform pro-
posals that only pretend to re-
strain spending.8 The debate
over reimportation of prescrip-
tion drugs from Canada is the
exception that proves the rule
that the US is not serious about
cost control. Yet, as has been
discussed in these pages,9 even
this debate is quixotic.
The immediate future of
health reform in the US de-
pends as much on the results
from this year’s congressional
elections as it does on the presi-
dential contest. The probability
and shape of health reform will
turn crucially on the partisan
configuration of Congress in
2005, as well as on trends in
costs, insurance and employ-
ment. However, those hoping
that the US will at last achieve
universal coverage and control
costs are likely be disappointed
by both parties’ proposals and
by whatever incremental action
(or inaction) that follows this
election.
Jonathan Oberlander
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Box 2: The US presidential election platforms on health insurance7
George Bush (Republican) John Kerry (Democrat)
• Tax credits for uninsured to purchase
non-group insurance. (Maximum credit
$3000 for families, $1000 for
individuals with low incomes)
• Health savings accounts to enable
individuals to contribute tax-preferred
funds to pay for medical expenses (in
combination with a high-deductible
insurance policy)
• Association Health Plans that allow
small businesses to pool together to
buy health insurance
• Liberalize eligibility for Medicaid and
the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (both for low-income citizens).
• Federal government assumes all state
costs for covering children under
Medicaid
• Tax subsidies to uninsured and small
businesses to buy private health
insurance (through the current program
for federal employees)
• Federal reinsurance plan to cover 75%
of costs for most expensive patients and
thus reduce the price of employer-
provided insurance
Projected coverage and costs
• Would cover 4 million currently
uninsured
• Would cover 27 million currently
uninsured
• $70 billion over 10 years • $900 billion over 10 years
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